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CHAPTER I 
THE INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES OF 
THE MIDDLE AGES 
Any attempt to describe the intellectual climate 
of sixteenth century Europe necessitates a progressive 
study of the current of Western thought. The heritage of 
ancient Greece and Rome, the rise of Christianity, and the 
influence of alien cultures all played important parts in 
formulating European attitudes. In retrospect, however, 
these factors seem to be of an evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary nature. The accumulation of knowledge from 
the downfall of the Roman Empire until the latter part of 
the Middle Ages was a gradual and one-sided process. 
Christianity and the consequent creation of the institu-
tion of the church provided the only cohesive element 
active in this process of accumulation. Thus the energy 
of creativeness in almost every field was channeled toward 
the glorification of the Christian God. This situation in 
no way detracted from or frustrated creative thinking as 
long as it remained inside definite bounds, but it did 
effectively discourage attempts to propagate unorthodox 
ideas. 
2 
The pinnacle of ecclesiastical authority was reached 
during the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. 
The church at this time was not only the supreme spiritual 
power, but was also respected as a higher authority in 
temporal matters than were the ruling kings and princes. 
Final authority rested not on a foundation of military or 
political power, but in the unquestioning faith of medieval 
man in the theological teachings of Christianity. St. Anselm, 
the French Benedictine who became the Archbishop of Canter-
bury, clearly displayed this type of faith when he wrote in 
his famous proof of the existence of God: "I do not seek 
to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order 
to understand. For this also I believe, that unless I 
believed, I should not understand."1 St. Anselm's search 
for knowledge under those conditions was representative of 
the complete trust that medieval man placed in his church 
and God. 
Religion was their chief preoccupation because they 
desired salvation. Although the love of knowledge 
for its own sake was far from uncommon, the scholars 
of the age sought knowledge primarily because t~ey 
hoped it would aid them in achieving salvation. 
It is important to note that because the authority 
of the church was so far reaching, every individual was 
1Anne Fremantle, The Age of Belief: The Medieval 
Philosophers (New York: The New American Library, 1955), 
p. 88. 
2sidney Painter, A History of the Middle Ages, 
248-1500 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 430. 
3 
duly influenced by it. The unity of Europe such as it was 
under feudalism was not a political unity, but that of a 
unity of Christendom. A major drawback of this situation 
was that the intellectual contributions of the Middle Ages 
for the most part remained static and conservative. The 
arts, science, philosophy, and, of course, theology were 
completely subjected to principles concerning the salvation 
of the soul and the concept of eternal life. 
If it were possible to completely ignore the 
achievements of architecture, the conclusion that middle 
age art produced little in terms of originality would be 
valid. However, by the twelfth century the religious theme 
provided a brilliant stimulation in this area, and the 
results were ..... churches that were at once works of 
art and places of worship. • • • ffend] to the believing 
medieval [persoti) a daily instrument of believed religion ... 3 
Since science was not considered to be an instrument 
of salvation, advances in this field were practically non-
existent. "Medieval lack of interest in natural phenomena 
and disregard of individual judgement had their roots in 
the domination of a supernatural outlook, an other wordly 
mentality."4 However, "In assaying the progress made in 
3Irwin Edman, Arts and the Man (New York: w. w. 
Norton & Co., 1939), p. 41, 42. 
4Abraham Wolf, A History of Science Technology and 
Philoso h in the 16tn & 1 th Centuries {New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1935 , p.2. 
4 
the development of human knowledge during the Middle Ages, 
it is important to distinguish between the theoretical and 
the purely pragmatic. • • • Increases of knowledge by 
observation and experience was particularly great in 
agricultural and industrial techniques.••5 Theoretical 
science was not so fortunate. As was mentioned earlier, 
theories regarding the physical and natural sciences that 
transcended theological guidelines suffered either rejection 
or, in some cases, advocates of unapproved theories were 
persecuted. 
The extent of scientific retardation can be easily 
understood by examining one of the concepts of intermixed 
dogma and natural science: 
Thus the lion has these characteristics. As he moves 
along, he erases his footprints with his tail. This 
symbolizes the secrecy of the Incarnation. Then, the 
lion sleeps with his eyes open. That is the way the 
body of Christ slept on the cross. Finally, the 
lioness bears her cub dead and on the third day the 
father roars in its face and brings it to life. T@is 
signifies Christ's resurrection on the third day." 
The scientist, because he believed at least super-
ficially in the complete authority of the church, found 
little inclination to question the validity of such reason-
ing, The secular, objective view of science was to come 
at a later age, but the middle age mind subjected to 
religious boundaries tended to view such things as nature 
5Painter, p. 435, 436. 
6 Ibid., p, 433. 
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through an aura of mysticism. "The intellect was not yet 
in possession of the resources that would have enabled it 
to come under the spell of scientific discovery ... 7 Even 
after the scientific method asserted its superiority, 
modern science found it very difficult to shrug this 
influence of mysticism inherited from the Middle Ages. 
Theology and philosophy were the most active 
concerns in middle age thought. The rise of scholasticism, 
especially the second part of the movement which lasted 
approximately from 1200 to 1450, saw the subservience of 
philosophy to theology. 8 The position that philosophy was 
forced to assume resulted from the spirit of the thought 
that was dominant during the above mentioned dates. Faith 
and reason, to use more easily defined terms, were con-
sidered by the scholastics as the two roads that led to 
the same conclusion: the existence of God. The roads, 
however, were not completely separate. The Bible and other 
divinely inspired works were considered to be foundations 
from which any conclusion drawn from reason must originate. 
"Since the philosophers of the period were primarily 
7Bernard Guillemain, The Later Middle Ages, trans. 
s. Taylor. Vol. 77 of the Twentieth Century Encyclopedia 
of Catholicism, ed. Henri Daniel-Hops (158 vols.; New York: 
Hawthorn Books, 1960), p. 103. 
8The first part of the movement started around 
850 A.D. with the establishment of the schools of 
Charlemagne. It ended around 1200 A.D. The intellectual 
activity during these two dates centered almost completely 
around the philosophical problems concerning universals. 
6 
scientific theologicians, their rational interests were 
dominated by religious preoccupations. Hence, while in 
general they preserved the formal distinctions between 
reason and faith, ••• the choice of problems 
• • • was 
controlled by theology."9 The extent of theological 
domination is clearly demonstrated by the most famous of 
the scholastic philosophers, St, Thomas Aquinas, when he 
writes in his Summa Contra Gentiles: 
No one tends with desire and zeal towards something 
that is not already known to him. But men are ordained 
by the divine Providence towards a higher good than 
human fragility can experience in the present life. 
That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be 
called to something higher than the human reason here 
and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire 
something and with zeal tend towards something that 
surpasses the whole state of the present life. This 
belongs especially to the Christian religion, which in 
a unique way promises spiritual and eternal goods. 
And so there are many things proposed to men in it 
that transcend human senses.10 
Thus, Aquinas points out that human reason can discover 
certain truths about the nature of God, but it can only 
carry us so far. When pitted against the mysteries of 
faith, reason fails and help must be sought from revealed 
religion. 
9Hunter Gunthrie, "Scholasticism," Dictionary of 
Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Patterson, H.J.: 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1962), p. 280. 
10st. Thomas Aquinas, "On the Truth of the Catholic 
Faith, Book 1 : God, " Knowledge and Value, (ed. ) Elmer 
Sprague and Paul w. Taylor (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1959), p. 333. 
7 
Aquinas' philosophy was a successful attempt to 
offset what could have been a thirteenth century re-
evaluation of Christian dogma. The scholastics, with their 
interest in learning, came into possession of the major 
portion of Aristotle's writings. St. Thomas, for his 
part, found temporary success in fusing the use of reason 
as taught by the pagan Aristotle, with the faith of the 
Christian religion. But soon after the death of St. Thomas 
this union was challenged, and more and more doctrines of 
the church began to be withdrawn from the reach of reason 
and assigned to faith alone. 
Though one of the main objectives of the scholastic 
movement was to create a harmonious union between rational 
and revealed truths, most energy was spent in defending 
church dogma against the subtle assaults of Hellenic 
rationalism. The attempt to fuse these two alien forms 
was an unacknowledged failure. The more daring and 
original minds began to recognize this by the end of the 
scholastic period, but the ecclesiastical minds continued 
the struggle well into the Renaissance. 
Before tracing intellectual activity into the 
Renaissance period, it would be well to evaluate the 
achievements of the Middle Ages. The nature of this 
discussion has been critical, but only because the author 
has been observing this short history of thought from con-
temporary standards. The church during the Middle Ages 
8 
stood as an obstacle in the path of progressive thinking 
not as an enemy, but because it was simply the only 
criterion available. By later standards this norm seemed 
quite narrow and generally unproductive, but it must be 
noted that religiously orientated thought was representative 
of the values practiced during that period of history. 
Consequently, the church provided a refuge for all in-
dividuals beset with issues that threatened peace of 
mind. Philosophical questions concerning such problems as 
immortality of the soul, existence of God, and man's 
relation to the universe were not staggering or over-
whelming challenges to the intellect. Revealed religion 
along with holy scripture proved beyond a doubt that these 
questions were merely concerned with the trials of temporal 
existence and had absolutely no bearing on God's plans for 
eternity. In the same light, a sound formula for salvation 
was within the mental grasp of every member of the church. 
While constructing his own distinct civilization, 
middle age man achieved heights that eventually became of 
significant historical importance. Ideas and traditions 
stemming from this period not only influenced the 
Renaissance, but modern times as well. 
The doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church have been 
little changed since the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, and 
they are today a very vital element in our culture. 
The ideas of individual freedom that marked the members 
of the feudal class became a strong element in later 
conceptions of the rights of man. 11 Il 
11Painter, p. 478. 
9 
The achievements of the Middle Ages are tremendous 
when measured in the light of the materials available to 
man at that time, but when they are measured against the 
period immediately preceeding it, the difference between 
evolutlonary and revolutionary thought becomes apparent. 
In the latter part of the fifteenth and in the 
sixteenth century the west, ••• left the medieval 
home in which it was brought up and began to study at 
the new university of human life opened up by the 
extraordinary changes in orientation that the hundred 
and fifty years following the fall of Constantinople 
(1~-53] eff~c ted in man's outlook on himself and the 
universe. 
Thus, the Jiliddle Ages gave way to the Renaissance, which in 
turn, served as a period of transition between medieval 
and modern times. 
12B. A. B. Fuller and Sterling M. I'1cMurrin, A 
History of Philosophy, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, 1966), p. 1. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RENAISSANCE AS A PERIOD OF 
INTELLECTUAL TRANSITION 
Needless to say, in a period which witnessed 
such monumental events as the introduction of movable 
type, the discovery of the new world, and the Reformation, 
it is difficult to point to any one event as being of 
more importance than the others. However, for this dis-
cussion the revival of interest in classical antiquity 
coupled with the secularization of learning stand out as 
accomplishments which stimulated new and, by medieval 
standards, daring speculations. Humanism, a product 
growing out of these two movements, began not in the 
Renaissance, but in the late Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas' 
attempt to fuse pagan thought with Christian doctrine 
combined the pursuit for truth and beauty with the struggle 
for salvation. The early days of the Renaissance saw 
this term take on a new and more human meaning. "The 
broader definition of humanism states the typically 
Renaissance notion that man and his activities (!rere] 
the most important and interesting elements of the 
11 
universe. Thus, man himself, rather than God, [was] the 
proper subject of contemplation and examination."13 
The new enthusiasm for Greco-Roman civilization 
began both geographically and spiritually in Italy. 
Although northern France had been the home of scholasticism 
during the Middle Ages, northern Italy became the undis-
puted birthplace of the initial phases of the Renaissance. 
Numerous reasons can be found for this shift of intellectual 
residences, but the most critical factors were the political 
and social developments that took place in Italy during 
the last stages of the Middle Ages. The form of govern-
ment in Italy during this period was unlike that of the 
rest of Europe in that feudalism was rarely a popular nor 
practical method of control. Instead, the geographic 
areas were divided into numerous independent city-states 
ruled by an oligarchy composed of nobles and rich merchants. 
Much like the earlier Greek city-states, cities such as 
Venice, Genoa, Milan, and Florence engaged in serious 
competition for trade, wealth, and culture. Thus, a climate 
favorable to intellectual endeavors attracted artists, 
writers, and scholars who in turn were eagerly supported 
by wealthy patrons. 
13John Louis Beatty and Oliver A. Johnson {ed.), 
Heritage of Western Civilization {Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 300. 
12 
The zeal for Greek and Latin classics reached its 
highest pitch in Italy in the fifteenth century and 
the first half of the sixteenth, and it was gradually 
communicated to other countries. By the sixteenth 
century the study of pagan classics 4 . . was being prosecuted throughout Christendom."1 
As the effects of the "new learning" began to spread, 
the more serious European thinkers began to utilize the 
fresh freedom of thought. Some of the most distinct and 
influential products of the period were Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
Luther, Machiavelli, Galileo, and Copernicus. Though no 
original philosophical thought came out of the Renaissance, 
new approaches in science, political theory, and art began 
a course of separation that eventually liberated the latter 
fields from the combined spheres of theology and philosophy. 
Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536), along with his 
close friend Sir Thomas More of England, "was • • • deeply 
influenced by the skeptical thought of the Renaissance. 
Erasmus • • • wrote various Colloquies containing observa-
tions and commentaries on the contemporary world, and, more 
lasting perhaps, published his penetrating analysis of 
people and affairs under the title In Praise of Folly ... l5 
The sharp and delightful satire exhibited by Erasmus won 
for him little praise from his victims, but the fact that 
he was able to successfully publish such critical material 
York: 
14carlton J. H. Hayes, Modern Euro~e to 1870 (New 
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 9 • 
15Beatty and Johnson, p. 301. 
1.3 
gives praise not only to his literary genius, but also to 
his deep insight into the affairs of his contemporaries, 
Though a devout member of the Roman Catholic Church, 
he felt that the clergy bore most of the responsibility 
for the disgusting condition of the church. In 1509, he 
published a satirical masterpiece titled In Praise of Folll 
which systematically criticized every type of consecrated 
ecclesiastical office. Of the bishops he wrote: 
If our bishops would but stop and consider what their 
white albs signify--namely, sincerity and a pure life 
in every way untainted; ••• it would be safe to say 
that they would not lead such troubled and shameful 
lives. But as it is they are kept too busy feeding 
themselves to think on these things; as for the care 
of their sheep, they delegate this duty !g one of 
their subordinates or to Christ Himself. 
The cardinals, monks, and priests came under similar 
denunciation, but the papacy received the brunt of the 
attack. Concerning the popes, Erasmus wrote: 
As to the Supreme Pontiffs, if they would recall 
that they take the place of Christ and would attempt 
to imitate His poverty, tasks, doctrines, crosses, and 
disregard of safety; if they were even to contemplate 
the meaning of the name Pope--that is, Father ••• 
then they would become the most humble and mortified 
of men • • • (j3ut] the popes of our time still insist 
on profanely attaching Peter's name to territories, 
cities, taxes, wages, and all money. These are the 
things they fight to uphold with fire, sword, blood--
inflamed by the zeal for Christ, of course. Having 
thus fought, they believe themselves to be justly 
called defenders of Christ, bragging that they have 
routed the enemies of the Church--as if the Church had 
any greater enemies than these charlatan popes • • • 
16nesiderius Erasmus, "In Praise of Folly," The 
Essential Erasmus, trans. John P. Dolan (New York: The 
New American Library, 1946), p. 156, 
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who corrupt His teachings by forced interpretations, 
and who scandalize Him by their infamous lives.17 
Erasmus, residing in northern Europe, wrote his 
critical evaluations from a removed yet subjective position. 
His concern for the gross hypocritical state of the Church 
was motivated by his devotion to the teachings of Christ. 
Unfortunately, the literal teachings of Christ had little 
value in the everyday battles for power and influence 
waged within the institution itself and by the church 
against governments seeking to control or usurp its wealth 
and power. 
The popes who ruled after the [Great] Schism ended 
did little to restore the tarnished prestige of the 
throne of St. Peter. The Renaissance popes were far 
more concerned with establishing the papacy as an 
Italian political power, patronizing arts and learning, 
living in splendor, and enriching their relatives and 
favorites than thel8were with improving their role as 
religious leaders. 
With these objectives in mind, the popes of the early 
Renaissance exploited areas of Europe where papal power 
was not rivaled by strong monarchies. Cries for internal 
reform, particularly from areas heavily influenced by the 
church, began to fall on receptive ears. 
The 
and 
In Germany, ••• there were fewer limitations on 
papal powers of appointment, ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion, and taxation. Rome drew enormous sums of money 
from Germany and the situation aroused the envy and 
17Ibid., p. 157, 158. 
18 Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, and Thomas G. Barnes, 
Emergence of the EuroEean World (Boston: Little, Brown 
Company, 1966), p. 11 • 
15 
cupidity of minor German rulers. This fact, together 
with the low moral prestige of the church, made the 
German people ard their rulers more receptive to the 
idea of revolt. 9 
The Augustinian monk who nailed to the door of the 
castle church in Wittenberg, Germany, his objections con-
demning the unscrupulous promotion of indulgences certainly 
had no intention of starting a religious revolution. 
Martin Luther was occupied with the thought of reform and, 
prior to his excommunication, directed his energy toward 
just this goal. Luther's profound anxiety is vividly 
expressed in a letter written the same day the theses were 
attached to the church door. The letter is addressed to 
Cardinal Albrecht, the Archbishop of Mainz, and in it 
Luther asks his superior to put an end to the ugly market-
ing of indulgences. He writes: 
What can I do, excellent Bishop and Most Illustrious 
Sovereign? I can only beg you, Most Reverened Father, 
through the Lord Jesus Christ, to deign to give this 
matter your fatherly attention • • • and command the 
preachers of indulgences to preach in another way. If 
this is not done, someone may rise and, by means 
of publications, silence those preachers. • • • This 
would be the greatest disgrace for Your Most Illustrious 
Highness. I certainly shudder at this possibility, 
yet I am afraid it will happen if things are not 
quickly remedied. 
I beg Your Most Illustrious Grace to accept this 
faithful service of my humble self in a princely and 
episcopal--that is, in the most kind--way.20 
19Ibid., p. 115. 
20Martin Luther, "To Cardinal Albrecht, Archbishop 
of Mainz, Wittenberg, October 31, 1517, .. Luther's Works, 
Vol. 48: Letters I, (ed.) Gottfried G. Krodel and Helmut T. 
L•3hman (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 48. 
16 
As history shows, Luther's pleas for reform were 
largely ignored. Eventually he was excommunicated and 
declared a heretic. However, the seeds of revolt against 
Rome had fallen on fertile ground, and the protestant saw 
the first organized internal resistance registered against 
the universal authority of the papacy and the church. The 
Reformation succeeded in removing approximately one half of 
the population of Europe from the Catholic Church and thus, 
the medieval unity of Christendom was shattered. 
The causes of the Reformation and the consequences 
resulting from this loss of unifica-tion constituted a 
complicated phase of transition 1n itself. Probably one 
of the more notable changes in the area of thought was 
the attempt to reject or purge the influence of medieval 
Christianity. The humanistic mind, particularly in Italy, 
openly displayed contempt for the medieval ascetic view of 
existence. 
Nature, so it was argued, had equipped man for action 
and usefulness to his family and fellow men; the culture 
of the humanists was not to lead man into seclusion. 
Also, material possessions must not be viewed merely 
with suspicion; for they provide the means for 
virtuous deeds, and the history of man has been his 
progress in becoming lord of the earth and its 
resources.21 
This reaction against the "dark ages." as it was 
termed by Renaissance scholars, affected all areas of 
21G. R. Potter (ed.), The Renaissance 14 20 
Vol. I: The New Cambridge Modern History London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 73. 
17 
learning, and since emphasis was placed on creativeness, 
there is a temptation to conclude that statecraft was a 
product of this period alone. "There seems no reason to 
believe • • • that the Renaissance introduced the idea of 
a state as a work of art, which could be created. But it 
did introduce the idea that the theory of politics 
should be a political and not a theological concern."22 
Niccolo Machiavelli expressed this realistic 
secularization of political theory when he described 
what he felt to be the proper conduct of the ruling 
prince. Published in Italy around 1532, The Prince won 
for its author nothing but outraged criticism from both 
protestant and catholic sources. The individuals dealing 
with rulers during Machiavelli's life were simply not 
removed enough from medieval-dominated attitudes to 
calmly accept such statements as: 
You must realize this: that a prince and especially 
a new prince, cannot observe all those things which 
give men a reputation for virtue, because in order to 
maintain his state he is often forced to act in 
defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of 
religion. And so he should have a flexible disposition, 
varying as fortune and circumstances dictate. • • • he 
should not deviate from what is good if that is possible.a. 
but he should know how to do evil, if that is necessary.~3 
22M. L. Bush, Renaissance, Reformation and the Outer 
World (London: Blanford Press, 1967), p. 301. 
23Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans, George 
Bull (Bungay, Suffolk, England: The Chaucer Press, 1961), 
p. 101. 
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Taking into consideration the war-torn condition of his 
beloved Florence, Machiavelli's work was a plea for 
stability, namely the political stability that he felt 
existed in classical Rome. However, Renaissance man 
viewed his plan as a wicked work inspired by the devil. 
In his attempt to break with mysticism, he states: "I 
am not unaware that many have held and hold the opinion 
that events are controlled by fortune and by God in such 
a way that the prudence of men cannot modify them, indeed, 
that men have no influence whatsoever. Because of this, 
they would conclude that there is no point in sweating 
over things, but that one should submit to the rulings 
of chance ... 24 In reality, which was exactly what he was 
dealing with, Machiavelli hoped to channel the existing 
intrigue and corruption into a logical, scientific system 
of political control. But neither the ecclastically 
dominated rulers of Italy, nor Renaissance man had the 
ability to transcend the state of naive hypocrisy that 
Machiavelli rebelled against. "It was not until the late 
seventeenth century that the views of Machiavelli were 
made effective. Only then was it generally possible, in 
the Machiavellian manner, to regard political theory in 
wholly political terms. 0 25 
24 Ibid., p. 130. 
25Bush, p. 304. 
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Basically, the problem of theological deterrence 
remained in the field of science also. The degree of 
importance attached to science in the Middle Ages, as 
pointed out earlier, was minimal and, because of this, 
Renaissance scientists such as Copernicus and Galileo were 
forced to work under very difficult conditions. These 
very conditions and the skeptical reaction against them 
paved the way not only for the new science, but also for 
modern philosophy. 
The most important way in which men in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reacted against 
the Italian Renaissance was in matters of natural 
science. The Renaissance certainly prepared the way 
for the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth 
century, but when it came, the revolution was 
achieved by dispensing with the basic tenets of 
Renaissance learning; namely, its reverence for the 
world of antiquity and its mistrust of systems of 
thought.26 
It is rather ironic that the popular revival of 
classical learning, which was so important to Renaissance 
man, possessed the seeds of destruction for both ideals. 
The scholarly interest in all the writings of the ancients 
naturally forced new and more accurate translations. "The 
humanists of the Renaissance made important contributions 
not only by unearthing long-lost texts but also by freeing 
ancient texts of the mistranslations, abbreviations and 
misguided commentary with which they had become distorted 
and encrusted during the course of intervening centuries. 11 27 
26rbid., p. 305. 
27Ibid., p. 306. 
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Thus, when the original texts, stripped of the haze of 
superstition, were presented to scientific minds, many of 
the gross misconceptions of the Middle Ages became disap-
pointingly clear. 
As a reaction against centuries of haphazard 
speculation, specialists in all areas of knowledge began 
to rely on precise measurements based on newly introduced 
scientific instruments and controlled experiments. There 
were not only doubts about the validity of the medieval 
texts, but also of the foundations of ancient knowledge 
itself. The critical study of this knowledge exposed both 
the truth and error in classical thinking and forced 
scientists to realize that the traditional criterions were 
not as infallible as once thought. The search for a new 
and more reliable standard eventually saw the downfall of 
classical and ecclesiastical authority. The quest for 
knowledge now assumed a pragmatic view, and the escape 
from middle age mysticism began. 
"The most dramatic and revolutionary advances were 
made in the study of physics and astronomy. For centuries 
Western man had accepted the Greek view of the cosmos, 
which wac in agreement with appearances. Men could plainly 
see the celestial bodies move each day in a circular path 
around the earth; consequently, they constructed a geo-
centric or earth-centered cosmology. 028 The church was 
28Blum, Cameron, and Barnes, p. 188. 
21 
in full agreement with the geocentric concept of the 
universe mainly because it provided a foundation for the 
idea of the benevolent God-man relationship. "Everything 
was conceived as having been intended and designed to 
serve some human needs. One might almost say that God 
himself was regarded as mainly occupied with human affairs. 
When mankind was thus conceived as the focus of cosmic 
economy, the earth, their stage, was naturally looked 
upon as the centre of the universe ... 29 
The revival of ancient knowledge was also accompanied 
by a renewed interest in witchcraft and astrology. Popular 
witch hunts of the sixteenth century contributed nothing to 
the advancement of science, but the age old belief in the 
power of the stars roused Renaissance soothsayers to study 
with renewed vigor the nature of the heavens. 
Astrology was held the noblest of sciences, and its 
enlightenment and guidance sought in the most im-
portant affairs of life. As an explanation of the 
world and human fortunes, it rivalled or peacefully 
paralleled religion and belief in the devil. Progress 
in physics and astronomy and firmer conceptions of 
physical laws were gradually to dissolve this 
authorative congeries of unsound conviction.JO 
Nicolaus Copernicus, born in 1473, was one of the 
first Renaissance thinkers to cast doubt on the traditional 
29wolf, p. 5. 
JOHenry Osborn Taylor, Philosophy and Science in 
the Sixteenth Century, Vol. V: Thou6ht and Expression in 
the Sixteenth Century (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 
p, 88. 
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geocentric concept of the universe. Criticism of the 
geocentric theory did not originate with Copernicus' ideas. 
"Nicholas of Cusa had declared that the earth moved like 
the planets, and was not the centre of the universe •••• 
Likewise, Leonardo asserted that the earth is not fixed at 
the centre of the celestial world, nor at the centre of the 
circle of the sun, which is the central body, and the source 
of light and warmth. But these ideas were not as yet 
fortified with any proof ... 31 Copernicus, bothered by the 
discrepancies he discovered in the writings of the Greek 
astronomers, set out to simplify and correct the calculated 
movements of the celestial bodies. "He found that ancient 
Greek scientists had suggested that the sun, not the earth, 
stands immobile at the center of the cosmos. • • • • 
Inspired by this discovery, he showed by brilliant cal-
cu1ations that the motions of the heavenly bodies can all 
be explained by assuming a sun-centered or heliocentric 
universe ... 32 Though the hypothesis was founded on seemingly 
convincing evidence, strong opposition arose from almost 
every corner of the Renaissance world. Copernicus realized 
that his theory would cause a great stir, and, consequently, 
he put off publication in order to avoid confrontation with 
the religious and intellectual forces. However, a simplified 
31rbid., p. 93. 
32Blum, Cameron, and Barnes, p. 191. 
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explanation of the above Greek model of the universe 
shows that: 
33 
• • • the earth stood unmoving at the center of a series 
of hollow, transparent spheres that daily rotated around 
the earth. Each of the crystalline spheres had em-
bedded in it one of the heavenly bodies--the sun, the 
moon and the five known planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, 
Jupiter, Saturn). Next came the sphere of the fixed 
stars, holding the stars that move about the earth but 
seem to be motionless with respect to one another. 
Finally there was an outermost sphere, the primum 
mobile or .. first mover," which provided spin to the 
spheres nested within it. Beyond lay the "empyrean," 
where God dwelt. The heavenly bodies ••• were thought 
to be made of a pure and immortal substance, entirely 
different from4the corrupt and mortal matter that made 
up the earth.3 
33~ •• p. 189. 
34rbid., p. 188. 
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In direct refutation of the Greek model, transla-
tions from Copernicus• original Latin texts show that: 
1. There is no one centre for all the celestial 
orbits or spheres. 
2. The centre of the Earth is not the centre of the 
World. 
3. All the planetary orbits circle around the sun at 
the centre of them all. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5. The apparent movement in the firmament is due to 
the movement of the earth; accordingly the earth 
turns once a day on its unchanging poles, while 
the firmament and ultimate heaven remain unmoved. 
6, Whatever movement we find in the sun is due to the 
earth and our orbit in which we are rolled around 
the sun; and thus the earth has several motions. 
7. Th8 apparent irregularities in the movements of 
the planets are go be ascribed to the motion of 
the earth ••• 3 
35rbid., p. 191. 
36Taylor, p. 96. 
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The essence of the hypothesis eventually became known, and 
Copernicus suffered verbal chastizement from various 
thinkers, including Martin Luther. Religious leaders from 
both camps of Christianity denounced the hypothesis as 
being nothing but a rash denial of scriptural teachings. 
They based their argument around verses twelve and thirteen 
in Chapter Ten of the Book of Joshua. The quote states 
that prior to a battle between the men of Israel and the 
Amorites, Joshua said: 
"Sun, stand thou still at Gibeon, 
and thou moon in the valley • • • 
and the sun stood still and the moon stayed, ..... 37 
Because Copernicus' critics felt that the Bible did in fact 
state nothing but the truth, they treated the heliocentric 
theory as a speculative nuisance rather than a dangerous 
threat. 
"The man who paved the way for a more satisfactory 
explanation of planetary motion was Galileo, professor of 
mathematics at Padua, and a man of many interests who ex-
amined every scientific subject under discussion in his day. 
In the study of the universe his first great contribution 
was to convince most people that the Copernican system • • • 
was fundamentally sound. •·3~ With the aid of a telescope, 
37Jos. 10:12-13. 
38oavid Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century 
(London: MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 48. 
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Galileo discovered, among other natural phenomena, sun 
spots and the moons of Jupiter. Thus, he convinced him-
self of the validity of Copernicus' theory and set out 
with scientific zeal to persuade the unappreciative 
Renaissance minds. The crusade met with violent opposi-
tion. "He soon discovered ••• that scholars, philosophers, 
and churchmen • • • opposed the Copernican system because 
they felt that it flew in the face of theology and common 
sense ...... 39 Part of the threat to theology has been 
discussed in the case of Copernicus, but the threat to 
common sense deserves special attention because of the 
problems it produced for the seventeenth century. 
As noted earlier, the Renaissance and Reformation 
were largely responsible for the breakdown of the universal 
authority of the Catholic Church. Once its totalitarian 
position began to crumble, the criterion that had been the 
mainstay for European thought disappeared with it. Salva-
tion of the soul, which was still of prime importance to 
sixteenth and seventeenth century western man, was being 
offered by every fragment of the Christian religion. Each 
possessed its own doctrine and each claimed that eternal 
life could be gained only through its own method of worship, 
The pain of doubt had burdened the Christian population 
since the Reformation. With the advent of the new science, 
39Blum, Cameron, and Barnes, p. 196, 
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which was effectively introduced by such men as Galileo 
and Kepler, Western man was forced to re-evaluate his 
whole concept of knowledge, 
Prior to the introduction of the new science, 
European man, under the guidance of scripture, was con-
vinced that his knowledge was, in fact, truth. He had little 
reason to feel that his ideas concerning the nature of the 
universe and his central position in relation to it could 
be false. There was also little serious speculation about 
a universe that extended infinitely back or infinitely 
forward in time, In short, it existed in the finite 
bounds of both time and space. 4° Creation presented no 
problem, for the complete story could be found in Genesis 
along with the description of the fall of man. So when 
the climate of intellectual security was seriously threatened 
by theoretical science, Renaissance man reacted with 
natural disbelief. 
Galileo's confirmation of Copernicus' heliocentric 
theory not only disproved the validity of traditional 
beliefs, but it questioned the very possibility of man's 
ability to find knowledge that was true and final. To the 
common man, Copernicus' theory did not prove to be a 
crushing problem for most of them could readily point out 
that sensory observations clearly showed that the earth 
did not move and the sun did. However, Galileo's 
40see diagram, p. 23. 
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revelations based on scientific instruments and refined 
mathematics eventually made an impact on serious thinkers. 
This resulted when he discovered "that the movement of 
bodies anywhere in the Universe were subject to the same 
laws, and therefore could be explained in mechanical 
terms ... 41 His observations dispelled the traditional and 
revered study of Aristotelian physics, and Renaissance man 
saw the destruction of yet another criterion, 
By the end of the sixteenth century, Western man 
was left with very little of what could be considered 
certain and undeniable truth. The intellectual upheavel 
of the Reformation and the consequent splintering of 
Christianity destroyed the universal authority of the 
Church. The new scientists, forsaking both tradition and 
established authorities, undermined man's personal tools 
of learning and judgement by casting doubt on the ability 
of the senses to report an object as it was in itself, not 
just as it appeared. The rebirth of ancient learning re-
sulted in the revival of the sceptical attitude which, 
because of the general climate of intellectual chaos, 
became the rule rather than the exception for leading 
thinkers. This feeling infected most men of all educational 
levels. The individual, free from complete intellectual 
domination, began to assert this newly won freedom in a 
hesitant fashion. The uncertainty was caused by the 
41 Bush, p. .314. 
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possibility that one could evaluate the truthfulness of a 
particular statement according to one criterion, only to 
find that other individuals could invalidate the statement 
by using other criterions. Thus, forced to fall back upon 
himself, man found that even his trusted senses could not 
be counted upon to serve him with complete faith. The 
still lr;flu·~:n tlal Church fought for minds with medieval 
argum~nts on the one hand, and with such persuasive 
instruments as the Inquisition on the other. Finally, 
"Deprived of his traditional patterns and rules of judge-
ment and of choice, man ••• f:re1t] himself lost in an 
alien and uncertain world, a world in which nothing was 
certain and everything was possible."42 
The philosophers of the late Renaissance period 
made every effort to break completely from the scholastic 
system with its buttress of Aristotelian logic. "With 
reservations as to Francis Bacon, their systems presented 
a certain magnificent confusion, and lacked a sure founda-
tion in some irrefragible basic principle. 0 43 With learning 
fragmented there was no basic theme which would encompass 
all knowledge and give it final meaning. Therefore, 
sixteenth century philosophers began to formulate their 
thoughts into various methods that were personally comfortable 
42Alexand Koyre, Descartes: Philosophical Writings, 
ed. and trans. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach 
(New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Lts., 1961), p. ix. 
43 Taylor, p. 109. 
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but not reliable in the sense of being a universally 
accepted system. "Thus confusedly equipped, they were at 
sea with their own thinking upon the metaphysics of the 
universe. • • • Their thoughts in general sprang from 
their imaginations pricked by the new physical theories 
and enlarging knowledge of the world ... 44 To add to the 
disorder, both Catholic and Protestant leaders were un-
receptive to new ideas influenced by the new science. The 
Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake 
in 1600 by the Inquisition for advocating a naturalistic 
and mystical pantheism. Other advocates of philosophy 
based on or influenced by new science were sternly warned 
not to propagate ideas that ran contrary to current 
theology. 
By 1600, most of the authoritarian obstacles to 
intellectual freedom were rapidly losing influence. 
Scientists were still under the spells of mysticism, and 
the classical method of deduction. But advances in mathe-
matics and science exposed weaknesses in the method of 
reasoning from the general to the particular. Philosophers 
of this period were viewed as early modern due to the fact 
that they made a final break with the medieval method by 
introducing a new method using an inductive process. The 
application of this new method of reasoning in one sense 
completed the transition of thought from the Middle Ages 
44 Ibid., p. 110. 
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to the modern period. The influences of medieval thought, 
scholasticism, mysticism, and the Renaissance continued, but 
to progressively lesser degrees. The new scientists hap-
hazardly began the transition phase, but it was left to 
the first of the modern philosophers to co-ordinate the 
movement and at the same time lay the foundations for 
modern philosophy. 
CHAPTER III 
DESCARTES AND SCEPTICISM 
Rene Descartes, the French philosopher who later 
became known as the father of modern philosophy, was born 
in 1596, the son of a lawyer who was a member of the 
lower nobility. When he reached the age of eight, his 
father enrolled him in the famous Jesuit school at 
La Fleche. Here Descartes was given a solid background 
in the typical scholastic curriculum. His reaction to the 
scholastic method is recorded in his Discourse on Method • 
.. 
• • • I was ardently desirous of instruction • But as 
soon as I had finished the entire course of study • • • I 
found myself involved in so many doubts and errors that I 
was convinced I had advanced no farther • • • than the 
discovery ••• of my own ignorance ... 45 However, the 
Jesuits did succeed in opening Descartes• mind to the 
study of mathematics and science. As a young student, his 
father sent him, with a substantial allowance, to the city 
of Paris. "For a youth of seventeen he behaved himself 
45Rene Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences," 
French Philoso hers From Descartes to Sartre, (ed.} Leonard 
u s ing ompany, 1961), 
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extraordinarily well in the circumstances. • • • It was, 
however, comparatively easy for him to keep his head, for, 
young as he was, he had already developed the inner 
detachment, ••• and the dislike of society, that always 
characterized him."46 Instead of indulging in entertain-
ment and diversions, he began a serious study of mathematics 
under the guidance of the famous French mathematician, 
Mydorge. Descartes testifies to his own almost passionate 
love of mathematics in the Discourse on Method: "I was 
especially delighted with mathematics, on account of the 
certitude and evidence of their reasonings; but I had not 
as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; ••• think-
ing that they but contributed to the advancement of the 
mechanical arts ... 47 By the time he had reached age 
twenty-one, the lure of travel and adventure drew him from 
Paris to Holland. There he entered the army of Prince 
Maurice of Orance and began a career that saw him serving 
in various armies throughout Europe. Finally in 1629, the 
"settled in Holland where for twenty years he devoted 
himself to developing his philosophical system and 
46Fuller and McMurrin, p. 55. 
47Descartes, "Discourse on Method," p. 32. (The 
reference to his ignorance as to the true use of mathe-
matics is meant to show that prior to his discovery of 
analytical geometry, Descartes was under the impression 
that mathematics were applicable almost entirely to the 
mechanical arts. The Discourse on Method was written 
in 1637, while the discovery was made around 1617.) 
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publishing his works ... 48 During this time he began 
corresponding with the brilliant Queen Christina of Sweden. 
Eventually he accepted an invitation from her to tutor her 
in Cartesianism and to draw up a plan for a proposed 
academy. He arrived in Stockholm in the late fall and as 
a result of a severe winter contracted pneumonia and died 
in February of 1650. 
11Descartes• life and personality partake of the 
drama of his age. It [was] a life of passionate devotion 
to research, of discoveries, of sudden illuminations, of 
wandering and unrest, of bitter controversy ... 49 Probably 
his attraction to this type of life forced his move from 
Paris. The liberal climate of Holland, recently enhanced 
by independence from Spain, provided an ideal setting for 
Descartes' work. But such was the situation that even 
there strong opposition to his "atheistic 11 writing forced 
him to seek protection against religious outrage. The 
rector of the University of Utrecht attacked the Cartesian 
system because it proposed that the earth did move and 
thus was not the center of the universe. Also, word of 
Galileo's treatment at the hands of the Inquisition 
moved Descartes to leave unpublished a work concerning the 
48 Frank Sewall in a special introduction to The 
Methods, Meditations, and Philosophy of Descartes, trans. 
John Veitch (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1901), p. vii. 
49Ralph M. Eaton (ed.), Descartes, Selections, 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. xii, xiii. 
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physical operation of the world. Thus the devout Catholic, 
who realized the value of the new science, was embroiled in 
controversy with both Catholic and Protestant leaders. 
With this confusion in mind, Descartes wrote what he 
finally considered to be an answer to the scepticism 
produced by the Renaissance and a guide or criterion for 
the search for knowledge that was true and final. Part 
of his attempt to combine the traditional beliefs with the 
new scientific method was termed the "Meditations." 
The "Meditations" were designed in part to be 
experienced by serious sceptics willing to set themselves 
in a spirit of deep reflection. Thus, Descartes regulates 
the tone of the discussion when he writes in the preface: 
"I would advise none to read this work unless • • • they 
••• are able and willing to meditate with me in earnest, 
to detach their minds from commerce with the senses, and 
••• to deliver themselves from all prejudice ••• • 50 
With this mental attitude in mind, he moves to the "First 
Meditation" in which he proposes to doubt all his former 
beliefs. It is not his intention to establish as false 
all his former opinions, but only to verify their trust-
worthiness. Previous to this personal state of objectivity, 
Descartes reports that all his knowledge came to him 
50Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," 
From Descartes to Locke, (eds.) T. V. Smith and Marjorie 
Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 
p. 51. 
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through the senses. However, "I observed that these some-
times misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to 
place absolute confidence in that by which we have even 
once been deceived. 0 51 He asks: are our senses trustworthy? 
The new science of the period, as stated earlier, forced 
man to consider this question. Descartes carries it to 
the extreme. After satisfying himself that any type of 
knowledge obtained through the senses is subject to doubt, 
he then attacks the physical reality of those objects that 
the senses perceive. He considers the fact that his eyes 
readily report the shape, color, and size of an object, 
but this same object has appeared to him many times while 
he was sleeping and his eyes were closed. But, as he con-
cludes, "It must be admitted ••• that the objects which 
appear to us in sleep are, ••• painted representations 
which could not have been formed unless in the likeness 
of realities ••• and, therefore, 
imaginary, but really existent."52 
• • • are not simply 
This problem was in 
reference to material objects which, as yet, could not be 
considered as true and real. Abstract thinking such as 
in arithmetic and geometry, which do not bother with 
existence, seem at least to be certain. For, as he states: 
"Whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two 
51rbid., p. 56. 
52rbid., p. 57. 
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and three make five, and that a square has but four sides ...... 53 
But to doubt even this conclusion, he considers the 
possibility that God has purposely deceived him. This 
part of the "First Meditation" is particularly interesting 
because he immediately rejects the idea that God, being 
all-good and all-powerful, would consider the role of a 
deceiver. Instead, Descartes substitutes a powerful 
demon, "who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, 
and has employed all his artifice to deceive me: ..... 54 
Yet the substitution was in no way demanded by ecclesiastical 
pressure or concerned directly with theology. The demon 
represents a final move to put the reader in a state of 
complete doubt. The invention of the demon as the cause 
of deceit represents the strongest attempt by Descartes to 
remove himself from the influence of his previous knowledge. 
For, as he states: "Those old and customary opinions 
perpetually recur, ••• even almost against my will. • • • 
When, at the end of the "First Meditation," he sums up the 
difficulty of escaping completely from old opinions, he 
promises himself that, "I will continue resolutely fixed 
in this belief [of the demon] ••• and guard with settled 
purpose against giving my assent to what is false, and 
53Ibid., p. 58. 
54rbid., p. 60. 
55rbid., p. 59. 
.. 55 
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being imposed upon by this deceiver • 
• • 
Other philosophers, under the influence of, or 
reacting against scepticism, attempted to prove the 
invalidity of all types of knowledge but never all know-
ledge itself. "Descartes, however, was willing to consider 
the most radical and devastating of sceptical possibilities, 
that not only is our information deceptive, illusory and 
misleading, but that our faculties, ••• may be erroneous. 11 57 
By carrying the tools of scepticism to the highest possible 
level, he was able to set aside everything concrete and 
begin laying the foundations of the search for truth in 
an environment void of all possible error. Thus he hoped 
to find certainty through doubt. 
The "Second Meditation," the most critical of the 
six, continues with the same spirit of inflexible doubt 
set by Descartes in the first. "I suppose, • • • that all 
the things which I see are false; I believe that none of 
those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever 
existed; ..... 58 At this point there is no traditional 
knowledge left for him to consider that might be solid 
enough to resist doubt. "Is there not a God or some 
56 6 Ibid., p. O. 
57Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism From 
Erasmus To Descartes, (New York: The Humanities Press, 
19 64) ' p. 18 2. 
58nescartes, "Meditations," p. 61. 
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being, . . • who causes • • • thoughts to arise in my 
mind? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I my-
self am capable of producing them?"59 Descartes concludes 
from this that regardless of all the doubts concerning his 
senses, memories, opinions, and the external world, he was 
at least persuaded to doubt by something. If this is 
possible, then something within him, that which could be 
deceived, must undoubtedly exist. For, "I assuredly 
existed, since I was persuaded ... 60 This discovery is the 
first stone of a new foundation, which for Descartes and 
hopefully for the sceptical reader, proves that something 
within ourselves does in fact actually exist. Thus, by 
pushing scepticism to its very limit, Descartes points 
out that: "The process of do.ubting compels one to 
recognize the awareness of oneself, compels one to see 
that one is doubting or thinking, and that one is here, 
is in existence ... 61 Though proof of the truthfulness of 
his existence is now beyond doubt, Descartes finds that 
this is not enough to establish a criterion based solely 
on just this fact. He finds that after contemplating 
those receptacles of knowledge which he previously thought 
to be reliable, that the only mode of awareness which 
59rbid., p. 61. 
60rbid., p. 61. 
61Popkin, p. 188. 
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could possibly account for his existence is the mental 
process of thinking. "This alone [thinking J is inseparable 
from me. I am--I exist. • • • I am, • • • a real thing, 
and really existent; but what thing? 'l'he answer [is], a 
thinking thing, .. 62 To test the reliability of his think-
ing, Descartes uses the example of a ball of wax. In 
observing the wax, the senses report it to be light of 
color, solid, smooth, and even sweet tasting. These are 
the common attributes of wax. However, when the wax is 
heated, the senses report radical changes in sight, touch, 
taste, and smell. The change is so drastic that if one 
were relying entirely upon one's senses he would be unable 
to report that the ll.quh1_ ~·jC:U'" [!till essentially wax, but 
in ~ different form. Descartes finds that even though the 
state of the subject has entirely changed he is still 
quite confident that it is wax. Discounting his senses 
as the final source of information, he concludes that he 
knows the liquid is wax because the capabilities of his 
mind enable him to evaluate the different states of the 
wax. Summing up the.experiment and its relation to the 
problem under consideration, he writes: 
But, finally, what shall I say of the mind itself, 
that is, of myself? for as yet I do not admit that I 
am e.nything but mind. What, then! I who seem to 
possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece of 
wax--do I not knm-; myself, both with gree. teT truth and 
ce:rtitude, and also much more distinctly and clearly? 
62Descartes, "Meditations," p. 63. 
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For as I judge that the wax exists because I see it, 
it assuredly follows, much more evidently, that I 
myself am or exist, for the same reason: • • • And 
what is here remarked of the piece of wax, is appli-
cable to all the other things that are external to 
me. • • • But in conclusion, I find I have insensibly 
reverted to the point I desired; for it is now mani-
fest to me that bodies themselves are not properly 
perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of ~ 
imagination, but by the intellect alone; ••• 6J 
The conclusions of the "Second Meditation" effectively 
classify the school of philosophy to which Descartes 
belonged. As noted in Chapter II of this paper, the late 
Renaissance period saw philosophers groping for a ne1'1 
criterion on which to test the validity of knowledge. 
Two of the most important schools of thought that arose 
from the multitude of quests were the rationalists and the 
empiricists. The rationalists, represented in this case 
by Descartes, taught that knowledge of this world could be 
attained by the use of the intellect and deductive reason-
ing. One of the most important theories in this school, 
the one around which Descartes centered the "Meditations" 
was the belief in innate ideas: "Ideas which are inborn 
and come with the mind at birth, such as God and im-
mortality. "64 Directly opposed to this view was the 
school of empiricism which taught that knowledge could be 
63Ibid. , p. 68. ( 'I'he term "see" as used by Descartes 
does not refer to perception by a bodily organ, but to 
images such as those produced in a dream when the eyes are 
not in use.) 
64Runes, p. 146. 
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gained only by experience which was received solely by way 
of the senses. Naturally innate ideas were considered by 
this school as, at the most, merely illusionary fancies. 
But to the rationalist, innate ideas such as Descartes• 
cogito ergo~ provided a basis not only for the reversal 
of doubt, but for the foundation of certainty. 
Prior to the beginning of the "Third Meditation," 
Descartes accomplished three things: (1') moved from 
complete doubt to an understanding that he exists; (2) using 
the same method, he discovered that he was a thinking thing, 
and; (3) anything which he could perceive as clearly and 
distinctly as the cogito must be certain. Now he moves 
in the "Third Meditation" to prove the existence of God. 
In the earlier meditations, superior beings were mentioned, 
but only as fancies of Descartes• imagination. In order 
to understand and appreciate his proofs of God, it is 
necessary to grasp the meaning in which he uses the term 
''idea," When one thinks of a man or a tree, a mental 
activity within our mind produces a reasonably clear image 
of the above mentioned objects. Descartes claimed there 
are three types of ideas that can be associated with 
mental activity: innate; adventitious; and factitious. 
The innate ideas were described earlier; the adventitious 
ideas are those that come from sources outside of the mind; 
and the factitious ideas are inventions of the individual 
mind, such as music or poetry. In the attempt to prove 
4J 
the existence of God, he finds that only those ideas 
labeled as adventitious are valid in constructing proofs 
for the existence of God. The first proof introduced is 
commonly called causality. Descartes illustrates it by 
pointing out that ideas of men (or animals, or even angels) 
could come from within himself, but "there ••• remains, 
the idea of God, in which I must consider whether there is 
anything that cannot be supposed to originate within 
myself. 11 65 To discover whether there are any attributes 
of God that could not originate within the mind, he lists 
the qualities under consideration. "By the name God I 
understand a substance infinite, independent, all knowing, 
all powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing 
that exists, if any such there be, were created." 66 After 
considering these and contemplating their ultimate meaning 
to the thinker, he concludes that something outside and 
independent of his thinking mind does exist. 
And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, 
from all I have before said, that God exists: for 
though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to 
this, that I myself am a substance. I should not 
h~1{nver, have an idea of an infinite substance, seeing 
I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some 
substance in reality infinite.67 
To further fortify the proof, Descartes considers the 
possibility that his own creation was caused only by his 
65nescartes, "Meditation," p. 77. 
66Ibid., p. 77. 
67rbid., p. 78. 
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parents or some being less perfect than God. But he 
concludes, "this cannot be: for as I said b~fore, it is 
perfectly evident that there must at least be as much 
reality in the cause as in its effect; ••• I could not 
possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my 
mind the idea of a God, if God did not in reality 
exist, • .,68 The important fact to remember in studying • • 
the "Third Meditation" is that Descartes intended it to be 
read as a meditation in the strict sense of the word. His 
Jesuit education included numerous retreats which were 
designed to remove the student from worldly influences and 
place him in an atmosphere favorably receptive to the slow 
penetration of religious truth. From this exercise, the 
retreatant was expected to emerge at least partially re-
orientated t011Tard realization of the position of the 
individual man in relation to the Supreme Being. Descartes 
hoped that serious sceptics and atheists willing to follow 
his method of reasoning would in fact carefully reorientate 
themselves and engage the Cartesian criterion as a judge 
for the validity of knowledge. 
The "Fourth Meditation" dealing with truth and 
error explains the origin of defective thinking. "I am 
conscious that I possess a certain faculty of judging, 
which I received from God, ••• it is likewise certain 
68rb1d,, p. s1, BJ. 
that he has not given me a faculty that will ever lead me 
into error, provided I use it aright ... 69 In the previous 
meditations, Descartes established the fact that God was 
all-good and could not deceive him. But faulty thinking 
certainly did exist, and Descartes' novel answer for its 
existence was that error was entirely due to ourselves. 
He explains it in this manner: Each individual has within 
himself two mental powers, the power to think and the power 
to make judgements. Part of the power of thinking con-
sists of what ls called understanding •. But since we are 
finite beings, our understanding is, of necessity, not a 
perfect understanding. It follows then that laclc of 
knowledge could be the· cause of error. Descartes, however, 
rejects this idea and places the blame on the second mental 
power, that of judgement, or the will. Lack of understand-
ing, which because of boundaries set upon the intellect, 
is common to all finite beings. Therefore, while the 
power of understanding is limited, the use of the will is 
not. Lack of understaniing is merely ignorance, but 
misuse of the will is error. As stated by Descartes: 
Whence, then, spring my errors? They arise from 
this cause alone, that I do not restrain the will, 
which is of much wider range than the understanding, 
within the same limits, but extend it even to things 
I do not understand, and as the will is of itself 
indiffere.nt to such, it readily falls into error and 
69Ibid., p. 84. 
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sin by choosing the false in room of the true, and 
evil instead of good.70 
The formula for avoiding error is to simply follow the 
method of reasoning set down in the "Meditations." If 
we make assertions based only on clear and distinct ideas, 
then we will avoid mistakes. However, if through our 
willfulness we attempt to transcend clarity, then the 
threat of error arises. As Descartes sees it, understand-
ing and knowledge are limited to definite bounds, but the 
will, because it is not limited, enables the individual to 
go far beyond the resources of his knowledge. When over-
extension of the will occurs, then resulting claims are 
not to be trusted. Thus, "as often as I so restrain my 
will within the limits of my knowledge, that it forms no 
judgement except regard.ing objects which are clearly and 
distinctly represented to it by understanding, I can never 
be deceived; • • • "7l 
The "Fifth Meditation" contains Descartes second 
proof for the existence of God. The argument, based on 
the ideas of St. Anselm, is commonly called the ontological 
proof. However, unl.ike St. Anselm, Descartes uses a 
careful, methodical approach designed to verify the 
validity of his innate idea of God. The argument begins 
with a return to the clear and distinct ideas concerning 
70rbid., p. ss. 
7libid., p. 91. 
mathematics. Descartes finds that his ideas of number, 
extension, figure, and size, that is, ideas of mathe-
matical properties, do not depend on his thinking for 
their truth content, "They do not come to us through 
sensation: they are innate and express the nature of our 
mind, ~ndJ are elicited by our attention to what is in 
us ... 72 So Descartes discovers we do not invent them, yet 
we do conceive them as clear and distinct ideas and, 
therefore, they exist. In relating this type of reasoning 
to the existence of God he asks: 
But now if because I can draw from my thought the 
idea of an object, it follows that all I clearly and 
distinctly apprehended to pertain to this object, 
does in truth belong to it, may I not from this 
derive an argument for the existence of God?7J 
In order to clarify this proposition, he dwells upon the 
example of a triangle. He finds that if he thinks of a 
triangle he must also think of its form, nature, and 
essence, The idea of a triangle cannot be formulated 
without its attending characteristics, that is, they 
cannot be separated. Along this same line of reasoning, 
he realizes that he has "the idea of a God, ••• that is, 
the idea of a being supremely perfect."74 Just as he 
found it impossible to separate the characteristics of a 
72L, F. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes, (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 217. 
73Descartes, "Meditations," p, 93. 
74 Ibid., p. 93. 
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triangle from the idea of a triangle itself, so too, the 
characteristics of the Supreme Being cannot be separated 
from God, Thus he reasons "that the existence can no more 
be separated from the essence of God, than the idea of a 
mountain from that of a valley, • • • so that it is im-
possible to conceive a God, ••• to' whom existence ls 
wanting. • • • .. 75 The possibility of more than one God 
is dismissed, and once he concludes the second proof for 
the existence of God, he states the central theme of his 
criterion for truth. 
Although the right conception of this truth the 
existence of God [has1 cost me much thinking, neverthe-
less at present I feel not only as assured of it as of 
what I deem most certain, but I remark further that 
the certitude of all other truths is so absolutely 
dependent on it, that without this knowledge it is 
impossible ever to know anything perfectly •••• 
And thus I very clearly see that the certitude and 
truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone 
of the true God, insomuch that, before I knew him, I 
could have no perfect knowledge of any other things.76 
The closing words of the "Fifth Meditation" clearly 
demonstrate Descartes' attempt to close the already sharp 
division between science and religion. 
The sixth and last meditation deals with the 
reality of material objects. Using the reliability of 
mathematics as a background, Descartes writes: "I at 
least know with certainty that such (material) things may 
75rbid., p. 93, 94. 
76Ibid,, p. 96, 97. 
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exist, in as far as they constitute the object of pure 
mathematics, since, ••• I can conceive them clearly and 
distinctly."77 But he finds that this conclusion in no 
way accounts for the confused ideas of sense perception. 
Descartes admits that "I am accustomed to imagine many 
other objects besides that of corporeal nature which is 
the object of pure mathematics, as, for example, colours, 
sounds, tastes, pain, and the like, • • • At this 
point, it is strange to see that Descartes, in the effort 
to prove the reality of material things, has returned to 
the cause of his original doubts, that of perception through 
the senses. In the past, the senses had provided Descartes 
with an awareness of himself and the external world. And, 
as he states: " ••• it seems that they could not have 
proceeded from myself, and must therefore have been caused 
in me by some other objects; ..... 79 Another factor that 
forces him to return to knowledge received by the senses 
is that ideas entering through these channels are much 
more clear and vivid than those brought about by medita-
tion. Further, the power that produces these sensations 
must be of a corporeal nature and somewhat represent what 
the senses perceive it to be. Near the end of the last 
meditation, Descartes sums up this problem, as • ..rell as 
77rbid., p. 97. 
78Ibid., p. 99. 
79Ibid, , p. 100. 
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others dealt with in the earlier meditations. He concludes: 
• • • I ought not in the least degree to doubt of 
the truth of those presentations, if, after having 
called together all my senses, my memory, and my 
understanding for the purpose of examining them, no 
deliverance is given by any one of these faculties 
which is repugnant to that of any other: for since 
God is no deceiver, it necessarily follows that I am 
not ••• deceived. But because the necessities of 
action frequently oblige us to come to a determina-
tion before we have had leisure for so careful an 
examination, it must be confessed that the life of 
man is frequently obnoxious to error with respect to 
individual objects; and we must, ln conclusion, 
acknowledge the weakness of our nature.~O 
Intellectual circles did not accept the conclusions 
Descartes reached in the "Meditations.•• Moreover, the 
sceptics tried to show that the "Meditations .. were just a 
collection of illusions based on one man's opinion. "The 
traditional thinkers saw Descartes as a vicious sceptic, 
because his method of doubt denied the very basis of the 
traditional system ... 81 In reply to the attacks, Descartes 
pointed out that the principles on which the criticisms 
were based were themselves open to question. Though most 
philosophers and theologians voiced nothing but disgust 
for the Cartesian philosophy, the new scientists readily 
employed Descartes' methods as a fresh and certain approach 
to the study of science. Thus, by urging men of science 
to forsake the old authorities, Descartes opened the way for 
personal, independent judgement based on reason. This in 
soibid., p. 113. 
81 Popkin, p. 197. 
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turn resulted in the laying of the foundations for 
E'xperimental science and modern philosophy. 
The whole philosophy of Descartes was dominated by 
tis zealous persuit of certainty. The "Meditations," as a 
vehicle of this quest, can be looked upon not so rrnch as a 
proof of reality, but as a method of achieving a sense of 
certainty. "For Descartes, science must undertake to give 
the kind of knowledge which secures human felicity, and to 
achieve the kind of certainty which had belonged properly 
to faith. "82 
82Marthinus Versfeld, An Essay on the Metaphysics of 
Descartes, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1940), p. 169, 
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